Friday, October 31, 2008

The Imaginary Economy?

Speaking at the Asia-Europe summit Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recently said, “The biggest responsibility is to stabilise the financial order as soon as possible. We need to use all available tools to prevent the crisis from harming real economies.” The Premier's comment is hardly in isolation. Take, for example, an article recently published in the Times under the heading Banking crisis infects the real economy, or one from The Economist on Oct 9th titled The banking crisis overflows into the real economy. You will note the continued use of the phrase "real economy" in all of these articles - as though Wall Street and the banking sector could somehow be considered in isolation from that other place where people are born, work, eat, sleep and die.

I even met a student of economics and international relations (studying at the University of Vienna) who insisted that the entire banking crisis was ridiculous and that the whole problem was simply mass hysteria... a psychological problem. Her belief was that if everyone simply kept believing in the system that it would be fine. The problem was a lack of faith. Once again, I was surprised by the hidden implication that losses in the money markets were somehow unrelated to daily affairs - as though the bankers and stock brokers of the world were busying themselves by day playing an elaborate game of monopoly which bore no relation to the homes we live in or the food we eat.

However only those leading the meanest of subsistence lifestyles, completely divorced from any kind of trade, could be somehow immune to events of the markets. In the era of specialization we are all bound to the market. Firstly it is the place in which we sell our products and services (which are far too specific and specialized to be useful in such abundance to us as individuals) and secondly they are where we source all those things which we do not make ourselves - which for most of us is virtually everything.

And in the market place it invariably occurs that one individual might need the services of another, without having any services that the other person might want in exchange. The lawyer who wants a haircut, for example, can probably offer very little to the hairdresser in terms of legal advice, in exchange for the haircut. Instead the lawyer must find (and offer) the hair dresser something that the hairdresser does want. And even the hairdresser cannot necessarily offer the baker haircuts every day or every week in exchange for bread. Perhaps the baker is bald. So the hairdresser too needs something of value to offer the baker, the dentist and the plumber in exchange for their services (especially if all these later happen to be bald). Naturally people seek out products which are readily tradable to fulfill this purpose - a commodity which others will readily accept for their services - and this becomes money. Money is a readily tradeable commodity which emerges from the economy - a medium of exchange to help resolve the problem that all of the various business people above have - the double coincidence of wants.

However, although this function (a medium of exchange) is important and can hardly be overstated - perhaps money's most important role is much less obvious. For money, as Carl Menger pointed out, having emerged from the economy initially as a medium of exchange then starts to serve a very different purpose. Once money has emerged and one can readily trade goods for money and money for goods, it becomes possible to compare the prices that people pay for goods in the economy in terms of that common reference. Of course, people will pay different things for even the same goods. One person might pay $1.10 for a loaf of bread where another pays $1.20, but in sufficiently large markets where competition is present someone who happened to have a few hundred loaves of bread would probably be able to guage with a fair degree of accuracy how much he or she might be likely to sell that bread for based on the recent sales of similar products in the market. And so one might be able to estimate the potential monetary value of, for example, a few hundred loaves of bread or a box of beer or a house or a swimming pool.

The monetary value that we attribute to things (based on recent prices that they fetched in the market place) then makes it possible to compare the relative exchange values of different products and services in the economy and makes possible the otherwise impossible task of accounting. With a common unit of estimated value that can be attributed to each of the assets that a person holds, as well as a unit by which they might measure their revenues and expenses, it is possible to guage the profitability of one's activities. And when seen as an aggregate, the sum of the activities of all of the businesses in a particular region might be tallied to guage whether their activities have been profitable or not.

What exactly does profitable mean in this case though? Certainly, in the absence of inflation or deflation, someone running a profitable business will end up either with more money and/or controlling more capital at the end of the year than they had at the start. However, someone who toils to build up a business might well decide that, despite the fact that the business is making a "profit" from a purely monetary point of view, there is no sense in their continuing to invest time and effort in that business. Perhaps they have enough money already and would like to spend more time with their family and friends, and this is the reason that they decide to discontinue the activities of the business. In a purely Austrian sense of the word, the business in this case would not be profitable to the business owner since the cost of continuing business (less time spent with family and friends) outweighs the benefits (more money). So although money makes it possible to maintain accounts and guage the profitability of certain activities, there are most certainly many things that fall outside the realm of monetary calculation. Indeed, virtually anything that is not easily exchanged in the market place (such as time spent with one's family) will be difficult or impossible to place a monetary value on and thus impractical to include in one's accounts.

Of course, it is often said that everyone has their price and perhaps one could argue that the businessman above, for the right price, might be persuaded to continue the business. Perhaps if the business would turn a profit of at least $500,000 a year then he would be willing to sacrifice the extra time that he would have with his family in order to pay his son's way through a Havard law degree. So perhaps he could enter into the books an expense "Time not spent with family: ($500,000)". And perhaps for the business owner, this would be reasonable. If the business made more than $500,000 then he could say it was profitable (for him personally) and if it made less than $500,000 it was loss making (again, for him personall). Certainly the IRS would raise a few eyebrows at the accounting entry and he would be wise not to disclose this particular expense to a potential buyer of the company (who would see immediately that the business was worth much less to the present owner than they might otherwise have assumed, if they had seen a set of books that omitted this particular detail).

If we are to rule out the use of such creating accounting measures for the time then (which is not widespread in any case), the only thing that we can really say about profitable businesses in an economy is that the goods/services produced by these companies have a higher exchange value than that of the goods/services they consume. Companies that consume more than they produce are said to make a loss and companies that consume less than they produce are said to make a profit. Of course, the consumption and the production are expressed in monetary terms but that does not mean the companies are actually consuming money. What they consume is resources, such as steel, iron, health insurance, mathematical modelling services etc. And what they produce is no doubt some similar form of real, tangible good (maybe computers or apple pies).

When companies make a loss then, what goes missing from the economy is not money... indeed, if under our present banking system this happens from time to time this is entirely incidental and besides the point. More importantly for human concerns is the fact that the company consumed many more resources than it gave back to the economy. Those companies in our economy which make losses cost us (normally shareholders - but in the present day the government has taken it upon themselves to spread the pain far and wide, to be bourne by any productive citizen that they can get their paws on) and the cost is not merely monetary. The loss is not fictive or imaginary; it is not some wild hysteria or a lack of faith in the system - it is the loss of those real resources that the company consumed (steel, iron, health insurance and mathematical modelling services).

The creation of new money cannot fill the void that loss making companies (or banks) leave in their wake. Indeed, the losses that companies make are made on the basis of historical records and time, as we all know, only moves in one direction. There is no way, short of a time machine, to undo the losses that those companies make. The only thing that can be done is to try to prevent such companies from making losses again in the future, which is best achieved quite simply by dissolving the companies in question - freeing the resources that they consumed to be used by the remaining companies in the economy (which are profitable).

Thursday, October 30, 2008

An Interview with Paul O'Neill


Paul O’Neill says he enjoyed being the 72nd secretary of the U.S. Treasury (2001 – 2002), even though the job lasted only 23 months. O’Neill, who has been analyzing the U.S. budget since he went to Washington, served in the Bureau of the Budget, which later became the Office of Management and Budget in the White House.

O’Neill came to American government in 1961 as a management intern, and stayed for 16 years through the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. The last 10 years of his tenure were spent at what was the Bureau of the Budget, which became the Office of Management and Budget. There he became deeply involved in the issues of fiscal policy, budget balance, budget making, and helping presidents choose priorities for how we spend the nation’s money.

Then he moved to the private sector in 1977. In 2000, he was asked by President Bush 43 to come back to the government and be the Secretary of the Treasury, which he did for 23 months before he got fired for having a difference of opinion.


Q: When you took over at Treasury, how would you characterize the financial health of the United States? Are you surprised at where we are today?

Paul O’Neill: When I moved into the Treasury as the 72nd secretary, what we inherited from the Clinton administration was an economy that had been rolling itself into a modest recession for a year and a half. By that time, the dot-com bubble had burst and the economy had slowed down, and we actually had some negative quarters that we didn’t really know about until Clinton was gone and Bush 43 was in charge. But on the fiscal policy front we were in a condition where we had, for the first time in a long time, a budget that was in surplus.

I have to hasten to add that while it was in surplus, it was not in surplus on a federal funds basis. It was only in surplus because the trust funds were bringing in a lot of money and together, with federal funds and the trust funds, the Clinton administration was able to claim three years of budget surpluses, which we hadn’t seen since 1969. That was a year where we were in budget surplus with the use of the trust funds. The last year I think that we were actually in surplus on a federal funds basis, without using trust fund money, was in 1960, so we’d been at this now for 47 years of basically living beyond our means – especially if you think federal funds ought to be in surplus without using the trust fund money to calculate balance.

So in 2001, when Bush 43 took over and I took over at the Treasury, we were in a total surplus condition, and arguably (I think this was a correct argument) we needed to reduce taxes because taxes had crept up to the point where something like 20 or 21 percent of the GDP was being effectively taken by federal government. Traditionally, our level has been someplace around 18 percent or maybe 18.3. So I think it was correct to say that we could afford to have a tax cut, which President Bush 43 had run on in the 2000 election, and he set out to deliver what he promised in the election and I think that was okay. The reason that I agreed to come in as Treasury secretary was because I saw lots of things in our economy and our society that needed to be done, and I was encouraged to believe that Bush 43 was up for the difficult political things that needed to happen to make course corrections. Those course corrections still include fixing the Social Security and Medicare trust funds, and fundamentally redesigning the way the federal tax system works. I thought there was some prospect that President Bush would entertain the difficult political choices that needed to be made in order to act on these things, and I spent a lot of time thinking about these things over a period, better part of 40 years, so I was anxious to have a go at it.

Q: How did it go?

Paul O’Neill: The first part was the easiest part. Cutting taxes is always a cinch – it’s only a debate about who gets the credit and how big the cut is. But then we had 9/11 and it really changed where we were. The economy was still slow, although we were actually having positive growth in the fourth quarter of 2001.

But there was still a lot of energy and President Bush himself was bringing this energy that we need additional tax cuts. I honestly didn’t think that was the right thing to do, because I continue to believe we needed the revenue that we were then collecting to work on the Medicare/Social Security problems. To work on fundamental tax redesign after 9/11 while worrying about whether there was going to be another attack or a series of attacks would cost hundreds of billions of dollars. So I was against further tax reductions at the time, especially as we got into 2002, as I became more concerned that we were also going to need money since it looked to me like we were sliding into a war with Iraq. I argued during the second half of 2002 we should not have another tax cut because we need the money to work on important policy issues that would shape the nation going forward, and we needed to have, in effect, rainy day money for the prospect of Iraq and another set of attacks like 9/11.

That was not a popular view, and in fact, it led to a conversation with the vice president where he basically told me, “Don’t worry about further tax cuts, it’s okay. Ronald Reagan proved that we don’t have to worry about deficits.” Which is really a shock to me because whatever you may think about Ronald Reagan, I don’t think he or anyone else has proved that it’s possible to ignore not just deficits, but federal debt as well. I think it is true that you can be sanguine about deficits for a short period of time, but you can’t be sanguine about mounting debt for the United States of America. When we, the Bush 43 administration took over, we had something over $ 5 trillion, maybe $ 5.6 trillion worth of national debt. Today [Fall 2007] I think the number’s $ 8.8 trillion. That’s not an innocent change, it is a monumental change in the debt service that we have to do in addition to and on top of all of the other things that our country needs to do.

Q: Toward the end of 2002, you wrote a report that said that the current debt wasn’t the problem; it was the debt that we are stepping toward. Shortly thereafter you were asked to leave. Can you explain to me what happened the day you were fired?

Paul O’Neill: During 2002 I found myself being at odds with where policy seemed to be going, I kept arguing that we couldn’t really afford another tax cut and that we didn’t need one, since the economy was doing fine. But my problems were not just differences about tax policy and social policy and fixing Medicare and Social Security. I kept asking almost every week, of the people from the CIA who briefed me, you know, where’s the evidence for weapons of mass destruction? I see all of these allegations and projections of trends from 1991 and what we knew in 1991, but I didn’t see anything I considered to be evidence. One of the things I’ve been trained to do for a long period of time is to know what you know and to differentiate that from what you suspect or what someone alleges, so I kept being a pain in the neck and asking, “Where’s the evidence? There’s no evidence, there’s nothing I believe.”

Early in the administration, at a National Security Council briefing, there were a bunch of photos put on the table and it was alleged that this satellite picture of what looked like a warehouse that you could find anywhere in the world was a production center for weapons of mass destruction. I said, I’ve spent a lot of time going around the world, producing goods all over the world, and have seen a lot of factories and warehouses. How can you tell me this one is a center for producing weapons of mass destruction? There’s nothing here that tells you that? You may assign it that, but there’s nothing here that tells you that.

One of the things I found really interesting out of this experience is that even today, people that I have a lot of regard for their intellect, like Bill Clinton, still say they believed the evidence was there. I’ve never had this conversation with him, but it’s hard for me to believe a guy who’s as smart as he is doesn’t know the difference between an allegation and evidence – especially someone who’s trained as he is as a lawyer. I’ve been astounded, this is a bipartisan thing – people on both sides don’t seem to get the difference between evidence and what they call intelligence, which I would call not intelligence, just a bunch of fabrications. So I was working my way to the margins of what endurance that people had for me, both in economic policy and in everything else I encountered. I have to admit some of the things that I said during this period probably ought to have been tempered. For example, we were struggling with trying to get the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank out of the business of effectively bailing out private sector lenders who’d given money to developing countries with the expectation that the people of the United States and other tax-paying people around the world would bail out the private sector lenders. I said (probably not very advisedly), “Before we give any more money to Argentina, we ought to make sure it’s not going to go to a Swiss bank account.”

Which was, I admit, not very diplomatic, but it was true – and interestingly enough, in a few weeks a guy who had been the president of Argentina said, without any prompting from me, “Well it was true he had money in a Swiss bank account, but it was all his own.”
So in any event, as we moved past the election in 2002 and we had this continued conversation, a really heated conversation with the vice president about what I considered to be the inadvisability of a further tax cut, I got a call, early in December. I was in my office having a meeting with a group of people and my secretary came in and said, “The vice president’s on the phone and would like to talk to you. The vice president said, “The president’s decided to make some changes, and you’re one of the changes. What we’d like to do is have you come over and meet with the president and basically say that you’ve decided to go back to the private sector, that you’re ready to quit your involvement with the Treasury.”

I said I didn’t think I needed another meeting with the president, thank you very much. I thought I’d had plenty of meetings, and I thought he probably didn’t need a meeting and I certainly didn’t need a meeting. And I also said to him, “You know, I’ve been going along now for 65 years or so and, you know, for me to say that I’ve decided to leave the Treasury to go back to the private sector is a lie, and I’m not into doing lies. And so what I want to do is issue a press release tomorrow morning before the markets open so that they’ll have time to digest this news in case it creates any stir. And I’ll send the president a note telling him I’m resigning.”
And I think he was surprised by that. He didn’t try to argue me out of it, I think probably because he’d known me long enough to know that it wouldn’t do any good, that I’d made up my mind and that was it.

Q: What did it feel like to get fired?

Paul O’Neill: Well, it’s a first in my life – I’d never been fired before, I’d only been promoted to ever-higher levels of responsibility. But it was okay with me because I would have really been uncomfortable arguing for policies I didn’t believe in. One of the things I actually said to President Bush and Vice President Cheney when they asked me to come and have lunch with them, and to ask me to serve as the secretary of the Treasury, was that I had reservations about doing this. And one of the reservations I had was that, having been the CEO of a very big corporation for 13 years and the president of a very big corporation for the period before that, I wasn’t sure how easy it was going to be for me to knuckle under when I thought the policy was wrong. The thing I didn’t know is how difficult it would be to knuckle under if you thought the policy was not well vetted, that it was decided on the basis of ideology instead of what was right for the country. At that point I really thought the decisions were not being made on the basis of what was right for the country, they were being made on the basis of what was right for getting reelected.

It’s probably altruistic, but I thought for a long time we need presidents who are so devoted to doing the right thing with and for the American people that they’re prepared to lose for their values and to hang their values out in public for everyone to see them.

Q: Let’s revisit the conversation that you had with Vice President Cheney prior to you being fired. Can you discuss the difference of opinion that you had in regard to tax cuts and deficits?

Paul O’Neill: Sometime after the election – it must have been mid-November – there was a meeting of the Economic Policy Group, including the vice president. As we sat at the table in the Roosevelt Room, we talked about where we were and where we were going. If I remember right, Glenn Hubbard made a presentation that was displayed on the screen at the front of the Roosevelt Room and showed where we were going and what different tracks looked like and GDP growth and the rest, including the effects of the proposed third tax cut. I made the argument, which I had been making over and over again since maybe June or July, that it was not advisable to have another tax cut because of the need to fix Social Security and Medicare and to have some money to smooth the fundamental redesign of the tax system. We needed to have in effect rainy-day money in the event that we had another 9/11 event – and at that point it looked like maybe we were going to go to Iraq, and it was not going to be cheap to do that.

So I argued that we should not have another tax cut because the economy was going to be in positive territory and doing okay through the next couple of years anyway without another tax cut, and there were all of these other compelling reasons not to risk a deficit and not to risk adding more to the national debt. And the vice president basically said, “When Ronald Reagan was here, he proved that deficits don’t really matter and so it’s not a consideration or a good reason not to have an additional tax cut.” I was honestly stunned by the idea that anyone believed that Ronald Reagan proved in any fashion, certainly not inconclusive fashion, that deficits don’t matter. I think it is true on a temporary basis that a nation can have a deficit and have a good reason for having a deficit. I think the Second World War there was no way we could avoid having a deficit, but when we came out of the Second World War we started running budget surpluses again and did that through the ’50s and into 1960. It’s interesting, it’s really only been in the last 40 years or so that we’ve accepted the notion that it’s a bipartisan thing that we don’t have to have fiscal discipline.

A year ago there was this signing ceremony in the Rose Garden for the new Medicare prescription drug entitlement, and it’s going to cost us trillions of dollars. This event was not unlike any of the others in the Rose Garden on a nice sunny day, with the president sitting at the signing table with a bunch of grinning legislators behind him taking credit for this “great gift” they’re giving the American people. But none of their money was going to get given to make this happen, because the federal government doesn’t have any money that it doesn’t first take away from the taxpayers.

There was no mention of the fact that this in effect was a new tax on the American people, and we didn’t know how we were going to pay for it. It was only grinning presidents and legislators taking the credit for a gift, which strikes me as a ridiculous continuing characteristic of how we do political business in our country.

Q: If we couldn’t afford it, why did we give it to the people?

Paul O’Neill: If you can get 51 percent of the people in the Congress to agree with the President’s leadership initiative to say we ought to do this, that’s all it takes. And I think it’s regrettably true there are a lot of people who don’t understand that when they get a gift from the American people, it’s from the American people and it can only be paid for with taxes over time. I think the confusion is aided and abetted by the fact that it doesn’t feel like we’re paying for it. It’s a lot like running up credit card debt: As long as you can pay the interest charges on your credit card debt, you can live way beyond your means. In fact, we as a nation are living way beyond our means, and for a period of time, there’s no doubt we’ve demonstrated you can get away with it. But I think we only need to look at the fate of other countries who’ve lived beyond their means for a long time to see you inevitably get into trouble.

If you look at Germany in 1923, they got to a point where their currency was so worthless that you needed a wheelbarrow to haul the currency that was needed to buy a loaf of bread. You get inflation where people stop investing in your national debt, when they say, “We’re not going to loan you money because you’re not going to be able to pay it back.” It’s the same thing that happens to individuals and families. When you get extended to the point that you can’t service your debt, you’re finished.

You know, so you go through a calamity – either you go through a terrible inflation, which is a way of having a national bankruptcy, and you destroy accumulated income and wealth, and in fact you have a taking from all the people because suddenly their financial assets are worth nothing. You know, are we going to have that right away? No. But should the people who are in positions of political leadership know that and anticipate it and do something about it for the American people, you bet – and now is the time to begin doing something about it.

One of the difficult aspects of this debt problem is that it’s not very transparent to people who are unschooled in fiscal and monetary policy. In a way, this problem’s a little bit like the famous example of if you throwing a frog into boiling water. If you throw him into the already boiling water, he jumps out right away. But if you put the frog in the pot of cold water and turn the heat on under it, the frog will let itself be boiled because it doesn’t respond to slow increase in temperature. Our debt problem is something like that. If we wait until we have a calamity and financial markets shut us off because we’ve exhausted their belief that we can service additional debt, it’s too late.

This is a problem that we need to deal with without letting the heat be turned up some more.
I would hope we can demonstrate we’re intelligent people that don’t wait until they create a calamity in their country before they deal with problems that are obvious to anyone who’s ever studied economic policy and fiscal policy and monetary policy. You only need to look around the world to see places like Argentina, Turkey, and Germany after World War II whose governments have effectively achieved a meltdown condition. Knowing this can happen to modern nations, we should not let it happen to ours.

Sunday, October 26, 2008

Discurso al Recibir el Premio Príncipe de Asturias

por Tzvetan Todorov
Antes de la época contemporánea, el mundo jamás había sido escenario de una circulación tan intensa de los pueblos que lo habitan, ni de tantos encuentros entre ciudadanos de países diferentes. Las razones de tales movimientos de pueblos e individuos son múltiples. La celeridad de las comunicaciones incrementa el prestigio de los artistas y de los sabios, de los deportistas y de los militantes por la paz y la justicia, poniéndolos al alcance de los hombres de todos los continentes. La actual rapidez y facilidad de los viajes invita hoy a los habitantes de los países ricos a practicar un turismo de masas. La globalización de la economía, por su parte, obliga a sus elites a estar presentes en todos los rincones del planeta y a los obreros a desplazarse allá donde puedan encontrar trabajo. La población de los países pobres intenta por todos los medios acceder a lo que considera el paraíso de los países industrializados, en busca de unas condiciones de vida dignas. Otros huyen de la violencia que asola sus países: guerras, dictaduras, persecuciones, actos terroristas. A todas esas razones que motivan los desplazamientos de las poblaciones se han sumado, desde hace algunos años, los efectos del calentamiento climático, de las sequías y de los ciclones que este conlleva. Según el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los refugiados, por cada centímetro de elevación del nivel de los océanos, habrá un millón de desplazados en el mundo. El siglo XXI se presenta como aquel en el que numerosos hombres y mujeres deberán abandonar su país de origen y adoptar, provisional o permanentemente, el estatus de extranjero.

Todos los países establecen diferencias entre sus ciudadanos y aquellos que no lo son, es decir, justamente, los extranjeros. No gozan de los mismos derechos, ni tienen los mismos deberes. Los extranjeros tienen el deber de someterse a las leyes del país en el que viven, aunque no participen en la gestión del mismo. Las leyes, por otra parte, no lo dicen todo: en el marco que definen, caben los miles de actos y gestos cotidianos que determinan el sabor que va a tener la existencia. Los habitantes de un país siempre tratarán a sus allegados con más atención y amor que a los desconocidos. Sin embargo, estos no dejan de ser hombres y mujeres como los demás. Les alientan las mismas ambiciones y padecen las mismas carencias; sólo que, en mayor medida que los primeros, son presa del desamparo y nos lanzan llamadas de auxilio. Esto nos atañe a todos, porque el extranjero no sólo es el otro, nosotros mismos lo fuimos o lo seremos, ayer o mañana, al albur de un destino incierto: cada uno de nosotros es un extranjero en potencia.

Por cómo percibimos y acogemos a los otros, a los diferentes, se puede medir nuestro grado de barbarie o de civilización. Los bárbaros son los que consideran que los otros, porque no se parecen a ellos, pertenecen a una humanidad inferior y merecen ser tratados con desprecio o condescendencia. Ser civilizado no significa haber cursado estudios superiores o haber leído muchos libros, o poseer una gran sabiduría: todos sabemos que ciertos individuos de esas características fueron capaces de cometer actos de absoluta perfecta barbarie. Ser civilizado significa ser capaz de reconocer plenamente la humanidad de los otros, aunque tengan rostros y hábitos distintos a los nuestros; saber ponerse en su lugar y mirarnos a nosotros mismos como desde fuera. Nadie es definitivamente bárbaro o civilizado y cada cual es responsable de sus actos. Pero nosotros, que hoy recibimos este gran honor, tenemos la responsabilidad de dar un paso hacia un poco más de civilización.

Saturday, October 18, 2008

Maletín sigue ensuciando a Chávez

UN ACUSADO EN el 'caso del maletín' declaró durante el juicio, que se sigue en E.U., multimillonarios sobornos que involucran a políticos y militares venezolanos.

EL COLOMBIANO
AP - Miami, E.U. Publicado el 18 de octubre de 2008


El empresario venezolano Carlos Kauffmann admitió ayer que junto con su socio Franklin Durán pagaron decenas de millones de dólares de sobornos a militares, gobernadores y funcionarios de la administración de Hugo Chávez para obtener contratos multimillonarios.

Kauffmann y Durán están acusados de asociarse para ocultar que 800 mil dólares de un maletín confiscado en Buenos Aires estaban supuestamente destinados a la campaña política de la presidenta argentina Cristina Fernández.

Kauffmann declaró durante el juicio de su socio Durán que ambos estaban seguros de que si lograban encubrir el escándalo "íbamos a recibir grandes contratos, grandes sumas de dinero".

El abogado defensor de Durán, Ed Shohat, pidió a la magistrada que no permitiera el testimonio de Carlos pero ella desestimó el pedido. Shohat ha alegado que Durán fue inducido por el FBI y el gobierno de E.U. a involucrarse con el caso.

La fiscalía pidió que Kauffmann declarara para demostrar que la conducta delictiva de Durán, de 41 años, se remonta a años atrás. Eran socios desde hacía unos 10 años y compartían por partes iguales los negocios, dijo Kauffmann.

Agregó que junto con Durán pagaron millones de dólares de sobornos a la Guardia Nacional de Venezuela y los ministerios de Finanzas y Educación para mantener los negocios que realizaban con estas instituciones.

También mantuvieron multimillonarios negocios corruptos con las gobernaciones de los estados de Cojedes y Vargas.

Por otra parte, dijo que ganaron 100 millones de dólares en una operación para reestructurar la deuda de Venezuela. En ese negocio con el ministerio de Finanzas pagaron alrededor de 23,8 millones en sobornos al ministro Nobrega, el ex viceministro de Finanzas Jesús Bermúdez, el director de Crédito Público Alejandro Dopazo y el consejero financiero Lenin Aguilera.

Kauffmann se declaró culpable de desempeñarse ilegalmente como agente de un gobierno extranjero y de asociarse ilícitamente para ocultar el origen y destino del dinero. Durán, en cambio, es el único de los acusados que se declaró inocente y por eso enfrenta un juicio. Si se considera culpable podría ser condenado a un máximo de 15 años de prisión.

Saturday, October 11, 2008

Una explicación, para no expertos, a la coyuntura financiera internacional

por Lorena Ramírez-Giraldo

Antecedentes

2001: Explosión de la burbuja Internet.

2005-2007: La Reserva Federal baja el precio del dinero del 6.5 % al 1 %.

Con una tasa de interés para hipotecas tan baja, despega el boom inmobiliario. En 10 años, el precio real de las viviendas se multiplica por dos en Estados Unidos.

Empieza el problema...
Lo que para un pequeño inversionista americano es una bendición, es decir el poder comprar una segunda o tercera vivienda a una tasa de interés realmente baja, para un banquero se vuelve un dilema de rentabilidad, pues aunque coloque muchos créditos, sus ingresos promedio por el cobro de intereses bajan.

Ante esta particular paradoja, a más de un banquero en Estados Unidos se le ocurrió lo siguiente:
A. Dar préstamos más arriesgados (por los que cobrarían más intereses), y
B. Compensar el bajo margen aumentando el número de operaciones (1000 x poco es más que 100 x poco)

En cuanto a lo primero, es decir dar créditos más arriesgados, decidieron:
1. Ofrecer hipotecas a un nuevo tipo de clientes llamados Ninja (que en el argot bancario americano significa no income, no job, no assets). O sea personas sin ingresos fijos, sin empleo fijo y sin garantías reales.
2. Cobrarle al ninja más intereses, obvio, había más riesgo
3. Aprovecharse del boom inmobiliario.
4. Además, llenos de entusiasmo, decidieron conceder créditos hipotecarios por un valor superior al valor de la casa que compraba el Ninja. De acuerdo a las tendencias del mercado, esa casa, en pocos meses, valdría más que la cantidad dada en préstamo. Además, como la economía americana iba muy bien, el deudor hoy insolvente podría encontrar trabajo y pagar la deuda sin problemas.
5. A este tipo de hipotecas, les llamaron hipotecas subprime Nota: Se llaman hipotecas prime las que tienen poco riesgo de impago. Se llaman hipotecas subprime las que tienen más riesgo de impago.

Todo este planteamiento funcionó bien durante algunos años. En todo este tiempo, los Ninja iban pagando los plazos de la hipoteca y además, como les habían dado más dinero del que valía su nueva propiedad, bien galán se habían comprado carro nuevo, habían hecho remodelaciones en la casa y se habían ido de vacaciones con la familia. Todo ello seguramente pagando a plazos y con el dinero de más que habían recibido del banco.

En cuanto a lo segundo, es decir aumentar el número de operaciones:
Como los Bancos se vieron de repente dando muchos préstamos hipotecarios a la vez, notaron que se les acababa el dinero. La solución fue muy fácil: acudir a Bancos extranjeros para que les prestaran dinero ¡para algo está la globalización!

Con ello, el dinero que ahora en la mañana depositó un simple taxista ingles en su Caja de Ahorros en Londres (llamémosle Peter) puede estar esa misma tarde en Illinois, porque allí hay un Banco al que su Caja de Ahorros le ha prestado su dinero para que se lo preste a un Ninja!
Por supuesto, el Ninja de Illinois no sabe que el dinero le llega desde Londres y mucho menos Peter sabe que su dinero, depositado en una entidad seria como es su Caja de Ahorros, empieza a estar en un cierto riesgo. Tampoco lo sabe el Presidente de la Caja de Ahorros donde Peter deposita sus dineritos. Es más el Presidente piensa que el 'Bank of Illinois' es una institución seria con la que da gusto trabajar. Probablemente tampoco lo sabe el Gerente de la sucursal de la Caja de Ahorros de donde Peter es cliente. A lo sumo sabrá que el banco que él representa tiene invertida una parte del dinero de sus ahorrantes en un Banco importante de Estados Unidos.

Primer comentario:
Hasta aquí, todo está muy claro y también está claro que cualquier persona con sentido común, aunque no sea un especialista financiero, puede pensar que si algo falla, el golpe puede ser importante.

Segundo Comentario:
La globalización tiene sus ventajas, pero también sus inconvenientes y sus peligros. La gente de la Caja de Ahorros en Londres no sabe que está corriendo un riesgo en Estados Unidos y cuando empieza a leer que allí se dan hipotecas subprime, piensa: "¡Qué locuras hacen estos gringos!"
Además, resulta que existen las Normas de Basilea, que exigen a los Bancos de todo el mundo que tengan un Capital mínimo en relación con sus Activos. Simplificando mucho, el Balance del Banco de Illinois es:
ACTIVO PASIVO
Dinero en caja Dinero que le han prestado otros bancos
Créditos concedidos Capital y reservas
Total X Millones X Millones

Las Normas de Basilea exigen que el Capital de ese Banco no sea inferior a un determinado porcentaje del Activo.

Entonces, si el Banco está pidiendo dinero a otros Bancos y dando muchos créditos, el porcentaje de Capital sobre el Activo de ese Banco baja y no cumple con las citadas Normas de Basilea.

Empieza el problema
Algún avispado recordó las ventajas de la Titularización: el Banco de Illinois empaqueta las hipotecas -prime y subprime- en paquetes que se llaman MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities, o sea, Obligaciones Garantizadas por Hipotecas). O sea, donde antes tenía 1.000 hipotecas sueltas, dentro de la Cuenta Créditos concedidos, ahora tiene 10 paquetes de 100 hipotecas cada uno, en los que hay, como en la Viña del Señor, de todo, bueno (prime) y malo (subprime). El Banco de Illinois busca compradores para esos 10 paquetes.

¿A dónde va el dinero que obtiene por esos paquetes?
Va al Activo, a la Cuenta de Dinero en Caja, que aumenta, disminuyendo por el mismo importe la Cuenta Créditos concedidos, con lo cual la proporción Capital/Créditos concedidos mejora y el Balance del Banco cumple con las Normas de Basilea. Hasta aquí todo bien.

¿Quién compra esos paquetes para que el Banco de Illinois mejore su Balance de forma inmediata?
¡Muy buena pregunta! El Banco de Illinois crea unas entidades filiales, los Conduits que no son Sociedades, sino Trusts o Fondos, y que por ello no tienen obligación de consolidar sus Balances con los del Banco matriz.

Es decir, de repente, aparecen en el mercado dos tipos de entidades:
El Banco de Illinois, con la cara limpia,
El Chicago Trust Corporation (o el nombre que le quiera poner), con el siguiente Balance:

ACTIVO PASIVO
Capital
Los 10 paquetes de hipotecas Lo que ha pagado por esos paquetes, (si fue crédito o disminución de liquidez)

Tercer comentario:
Si cualquier persona que trabaja en la Caja de Ahorros en Londres, desde el Presidente al Gerente de la sucursal de Peter, supieran algo de esto, se hubieran afligido.

Pero como no sabían, todos hablan en las juntas semanales y mensuales de sus inversiones internacionales, de las que no tienen la más mínima idea.

¿Cómo se financian los Conduits? En otras palabras, ¿de dónde sacan dinero para comprar al Banco de Illinois los paquetes de hipotecas?

La respuesta es, de varios sitios:
1. Mediante créditos de otros Bancos
2. Contratando los servicios de Bancos de Inversión que pueden vender esos MBS a Fondos de Inversión, Sociedades de Capital Riesgo, Aseguradoras, Financieras, Sociedades patrimoniales de familia, etc.

Cuarto Comentario:
La bola sigue haciéndose más grande.

Quinto Comentario:
Nótese como el riesgo se va acercando a las familias de a pie, porque igual que Peter y animado por los promotores comerciales de la caja de Ahorros de Londres, cualquiera va y mete su dinero en un Fondo de Inversión americano!

Continuamos con la historia...

Nunca nadie debe dudar de la honorabilidad de los banqueros, profesionales sabios que saben cómo cuidar nuestros ahorros. Es más, para ser financieramente correctos, los Conduits o MBS tenían que ser bien calificados por las Agencias de Rating.

Estas dan calificaciones en función de la solvencia, liquidez, etc. Estas calificaciones dicen: a esta empresa, a este Estado, a esta organización se le puede prestar dinero sin riesgos, o simplemente tengan cuidado con estos otros porque se arriesga usted a que no le paguen.

Nota: Se incluye aquí lo que significa la palabra Ratings: Calificación crediticia de una Compañía o una Institución, hecha por una agencia especializada.

En términos generales los niveles son: AAA (muy bueno), AA, A, BBB, BB, C y D que es muy malo.

En términos generales un Banco grande suele tener un rating de AA, un banco mediano, un rating de A.

Las Agencias de rating calificaban a los Conduits (Fondos de Inversión, Trust Funds, etc.) y a las emisiones de MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities) con estas calificaciones o les daban otros nombres, más sofisticados y sexys, pero que, al final, dicen lo mismo. les llamaban:
Investment grade a los MBS que representaban hipotecas prime, o sea, las de menos riesgo (serían las AAA, AA y A).

Mezanine, a las intermedias (suponemos que las BBB y quizá las BB)
Equity, a las de alto riesgo de impago es decir a las malas, o sea, a las subprime, que, en todas estas relajadas circunstancias son las grandes protagonistas.

Y sigue la historia…

Los Bancos de Inversión colocaban fácilmente las mejores MBS (investment grade) a inversores conservadores, obviamente a intereses bajos.

Otros administradores de Fondos, Sociedades de Capital Riesgo, etc., más agresivos preferían a toda costa rentabilidades más altas, es decir más riesgosas. Entre otras razones porque los traders, los gerentes y los directores cobran sus bonos anuales en función de la rentabilidad obtenida.

Nos quedan los MBS muy malos. ¿Cómo venderlos sin que se perciba el riesgo tan alto que tienen en sí mismos?

Sexto Comentario:
La cosa se complica y, por supuesto, los de la Caja de Ahorros en Londres siguen haciendo declaraciones felices y contentos, hablando de la buena marcha de la economía y hasta de las obras de beneficencia que hacen en la comunidad.

Seguimos ...

Algunos Bancos de Inversión lograron, de las Agencias de Rating una recalificación (un re-rating, palabra que no existe pero que nos servirá para ir entendiendo el asunto).

El re-rating es un invento para subir el rating de los MBS malos, que consiste en:
Estructurarlos en tramos, a los que les llaman 'Tranches' ordenando, de mayor a menor, la probabilidad de un impago, y con el compromiso de priorizar el pago a los menos malos.

Es decir:
Yo compro un paquete de MBS, en el que me dicen que los tres primeros MBS son relativamente buenos, los tres segundos, muy regulares y los tres terceros, francamente malos.

Esto quiere decir que he estructurado el paquete de MBS en tres tranches: el relativamente bueno, el muy regular y el muy malo.

Me comprometo a que si no paga nadie del tranche muy malo (o como dicen estos señores, si en el tramo malo incurre en 'default'), pero cobro algo del tranche muy regular y bastante del relativamente bueno, todo irá a pagar las hipotecas del tranche relativamente bueno, con lo que, automáticamente, este tranche podrá ser calificado de AAA.

Séptimo Comentario:
Algunos especialistas empiezan a llamar a estas operaciones 'magia financiera'.

Para acabar de complicar las cosas para los depositantes como Peter, estos MBS ordenados en tranches fueron rebautizados como CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligations, u Obligaciones de Deuda Colateralizada).En igual forma se les podía haber dado cualquier otro nombre más exótico.
No contentos con lo anterior, los magos financieros crearon otro producto importante: los CDS (Credit Default Swaps) En este caso, el adquirente, el que compraba los CDO, asumía un riesgo de impago por los CDO que compraba, cobrando más intereses.

O sea, compraba el CDO y decía: si falla, pierdo el dinero. Si no falla, cobro más intereses.

Siguiendo con los inventos, se creó otro instrumento, el Synthetic CDO, el cual muchos aun no descifran, pero que daban una rentabilidad sorprendentemente más elevada!

Más aún: los que compraban los Synthetic CDO podían comprarlos mediante créditos bancarios muy baratos. El diferencial entre estos intereses muy baratos y los altos rendimientos del Synthetic hacía extraordinariamente rentable la operación.

Se me olvidaba, la gran mayoría de estos instrumentos de inversión, tan riesgosos pero tan rentables a la vez, fueron asegurados por empresas de reconocido prestigio y trayectoria. Esto con el fin de proteger al inversionista: Bienvenida a la fiesta la AIG!

Al llegar aquí y confiando en que no estemos tan enchibolados, vale la pena recordar una cosa que es posible que se nos haya olvidado a estas alturas: el hecho de que toda la complejidad de las operaciones descritas está basada en que los Ninjas pagarán sus hipotecas y que el mercado inmobiliario norteamericano seguirá subiendo.

Pero…

A principios de 2007, los precios de las viviendas norteamericanas empezaron a bajar.
Muchos de los Ninjas se dieron cuenta de que estaban pagando por su segunda o tercera casa más de lo que ahora valía y decidieron o no pudieron seguir pagando sus hipotecas.

Automáticamente, nadie quiso comprar MBS, CDO, CDS, Synthetic CDO y los que ya los tenían no pudieron venderlos.

Todo el montaje se fue hundiendo y un día, el Gerente de la caja de Ahorros en Londres llamó a Peter para decirle que bueno, que su dinero se había esfumado, o en el mejor de los casos, había perdido un 60 % de su valor.

Octavo comentario:
Todos a tratar de explicarle a Peter lo de los Ninjas, lo de su dinero en el Bank of Illinois y la Chicago Trust Corporation, lo de los MBS, CDO, CDS, y Synthetic CDOs.

Sin embargo hay algo que nadie sabe todavía: Donde diablos está todo ese dinero?

Hay una razón muy importante por la cual esta pregunta no tiene respuesta: nadie sabe dónde está ese dinero. Y al decir nadie, es NADIE.

Pero las cosas van más allá. Porque nadie -ni ellos- saben la porquería de instrumentos financieros que tienen los Bancos (Bancos de Inversión incluidos) en los paquetes de hipotecas que compraron, y como nadie lo sabe, los Bancos empiezan a no fiarse unos de otros.

Como no se fían, cuando necesitan dinero y van al Mercado Interbancario, que es donde los Bancos se prestan dinero unos a otros, o no se lo prestan o lo prestan caro. El interés a que se prestan dinero los Bancos en el Interbancario es el Euribor (Europe Interbank Offered Rate, o sea, Tasa de Interés ofrecida en el mercado interbancario en Europa).

Por tanto, muchos bancos emproblemados se ven de repente con problemas de liquidez.

Consecuencias:
1. No dan créditos
2. No dan hipotecas.
3. Muchos millones de inversionistas que han comprado acciones de todos estos bancos empiezan a ver como el valor de sus acciones se va en picada.

Para terminar de complicar todo, el Banco Central Europeo empieza a subir sus tasas de interés. El Euribor a 12 meses, que es el índice de referencia de las hipotecas, empieza a elevarse.

Como los Bancos no tienen dinero:
1. Venden sus participaciones en empresas
2. Venden sus edificios
3. Hacen campañas para que mas inversionistas como Peter inviertan más y a mejores condiciones. En Europa ya hay bancos ofreciendo a sus clientes depósitos a plazo al 4.75% Increíble!

Ahora resulta, que también las familias en Europa empiezan a sentirse apretada por el pago de la hipoteca. La diferencia es que es la hipoteca de su única casa! Al subir la tasa de interés la cuota sube (por favor leer siempre la letra pequeña en los contratos de hipoteca). No les queda más remedio que apretarse el cinturón y procurar llegar sanos y salvos a fin de mes. En España ya muchísimas familias sufren por esta causa. Hablando de España, no les parece sospechoso que los bancos españoles sigan reportando ganancias exorbitantes?

Con la baja en el consumo, los comerciantes compran menos a los fabricantes (digamos calcetines). Por cierto los fabricantes de calcetines no tienen ni idea de lo que es un Ninja. El fabricante de calcetines nota que, como vende menos calcetines, le empieza a sobrar personal y despide a unos cuantos. Y esto se refleja en el índice de desempleo, básicamente en la ciudad donde se encuentra ubicada la fábrica de calcetines. En este sitio la gente empieza a comprar menos en las tiendas...........

Hasta cuándo va a durar esto?

Pues muy buena pregunta! también muy difícil de contestar, por varias razones:
1. Porque se sigue sin conocer la dimensión del problema: las cifras varían de 500.000 a 1,000,000 de millones de dólares.
2. Porque no se sabe quiénes son los afectados. No se sabe si los cientos de bancos como el de Peter, bancos de toda la vida, serios y con tradición tiene mucha porquería en su Activo.
Lo malo es que estos bancos tampoco lo saben.
3. Cuando, en los Estados Unidos las hipotecas no pagadas por los Ninja, se vayan ejecutando, o sea cuando los bancos puedan vender las casas hipotecadas (al precio que sea) será el momento de saber entonces cuanto valen MBS, CDO, CDS y hasta los Synthetic. Mientras tanto, nadie se fía de nadie.

Noveno Comentario:
Alguien ha calificado este asunto como la gran estafa. Otros han dicho que el Crash del 29, comparado con esto, es un juego de niñas en el patio de recreo de un convento de monjas!
Bastantes, quizá demasiados, traders se han enriquecido con los bonos anuales que han ido cobrando todos estos años. Recuerdan al joven banquero francés que hizo perder $5,000 millones al Banco Societé General hace algunos meses? A donde habrá invertido esos fondos? Como es posible que lo desconocieran sus superiores?

Ahora, si bien es cierto que banqueritos como este se quedaran sin empleo (10,000 solo en Lehman Brothers) imagino yo, con lo previsores que son, que han de tener bien guardado todos los bonos anuales que se han ganado todo este tiempo por ser tan buenos en su labor. Este dinero lo han venido cobrando religiosamente y lo han de tener escondido en algún lugar, quizá en un armario o debajo del colchón. Por cierto estas formas de guardar los ahorros parecen más seguras y protegidas que todas las innovaciones financieras que se le pueden ocurrir a cualquier experto de Wall Street!

Las autoridades financieras tienen una gran responsabilidad sobre lo que ha ocurrido... Las Normas de Basilea, teóricamente diseñadas para controlar el sistema, han estimulado el abuso de sanos instrumentos financieros como la titularización de deuda, hasta extremos capaces de oscurecer y complicar enormemente los mercados a los que se pretendía proteger.

Saben Uds. que la banca de inversión en los Estados Unidos no está bajo la regulación de la Reserva Federal?

Las Juntas Directivas de las entidades financieras involucradas en este gran problema tienen una gran responsabilidad, porque no se han dado cuenta del riesgo abismal en el que se movían.
Entre estos debemos incluir al Gerente y al Presidente de la Caja de Ahorros de Londres, institución a la cual Peter confió sus modestos ahorros de taxista. Algunas agencias de rating han sido incompetentes o no independientes respecto a sus clientes, lo cual es muy serio.

Fin de la historia (por ahora...)

Los principales Bancos Centrales (el Banco Central Europeo, la Reserva Federal norteamericana) han ido inyectando liquidez monetaria para que los Bancos tradicionales puedan tener dinero.
La Reserva federal y el Departamento del Tesoro de los EEUU le han pedido al Congreso 700,000 millones de dólares para comprar hipotecas, títulos y demás instrumentos basura.

La idea es limpiar de la mala cartera los balances de los bancos, hipotecarias y aseguradoras emproblemadas. En lenguaje latinoamericano, lo que han hecho los americanos es nacionalizar las perdidas y privatizar las ganancias.

Además, aunque no nos lo han planteado así, debemos recordar que desde hace algunos días AIG ya es la mayor aseguradora pública del mundo. Sabrá Cristiano Ronaldo que el logo que porta en su camiseta representa el mayor escándalo en la historia de las finanzas internacionales?

Para ir terminando, un amigo mío pregunta: ¿De dónde sacan el dinero los Bancos Centrales?

Para no complicar la explicación de la Crisis, quedémonos en lo siguiente: Todos estamos pagando las imprudencias y mala fe de muchos banqueros, supervisores y de todos los políticos que no quisieron o no pudieron ponerle un paro a la avaricia de algunos.

Paradoja: Henry 'Hank' Paulson y Ben Bernake le pidieron ayer al Congreso poderes adicionales para administrar la crisis! confiaría Ud. en ellos?

Finalmente, insisto con mi pregunta ¿Donde está el dinero de Peter?